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Now You See It, Now You Don’t:
Depublication and Nonpublication
Of Opinions Raise Motive Questions
BY BENNETT L. GERSHMAN
The judicial opinion is the heart of the common lawsystem. The judicial opinion is what law studentsstudy, lawyers research and argue, and judges
apply through the doctrine of precedent. By authorita-
tively declaring and interpreting a general principle of
law, the opinion promotes stability, certainty, and pre-
dictability of law. By its fidelity to authority and princi-
ple, the judicial opinion assures the legitimacy and ac-
countability of our judicial process, and, for that matter,
of our judges. 
The judicial opinion, however, does not always live
up to its role. Judicial opinions sometimes hide or mis-
represent facts, are withdrawn from public scrutiny
after having already been published, or are not even
published at all. By these methods, the judicial opinion,
which to many is the equivalent of a sacred text, be-
comes vulnerable to criticism over the motive for the al-
teration. And the suggestion of improper motive may
undermine the legitimacy of the appellate judicial
process itself. 
The basis for these comments is a decision last year
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Anastasoff v.
United States.1 The court held that an Eighth Circuit local
rule, which authorized nonpublication of opinions and
explicitly stated that unpublished opinions were to have
no precedential effect, was unconstitutional. The panel,
in an opinion by Judge Richard S. Arnold, reasoned that
a court rule purporting to confer upon appellate judges
an absolute power to decide which decisions would be
binding and which would not be binding went well be-
yond the “judicial power” within the meaning of Article
III of the U.S. Constitution.2
To be sure, Anastasoff addressed only one example of
an appellate court deciding for itself the precedential ef-
fect of its prior written decisions simply by not allowing
them to be published, or by not allowing them to be for-
mally cited. But courts also apply other methods that
manipulate judicial opinions to conceal information
about the reasoning behind the decision, why the deci-
sion was altered, or why the decision was excised from
public scrutiny. These methods include (1) misstating or
distorting the facts, (2) altering factual findings or legal
conclusions that were previously made, (3) excising
opinions that have already been published, and (4) issu-
ing opinions that are not even published.
Misrepresenting Facts
It is hardly a secret that courts misstate facts. Every
lawyer involved in litigation probably can cite several
instances of courts misstating or distorting the facts in a
particular case. To be sure, the extent to which courts
misrepresent facts is hard to measure. Most of the time
the only persons who know about it are the attorneys
who argued the case. And they are unlikely to criticize
the court publicly. To give the court an opportunity to
rectify a material misstatement, the lawyer may file a
motion to reargue the case based on the court’s mis-
taken description of the facts. But it is rare that a court
will even acknowledge a mistake, let alone correct it.
Why do courts misstate facts? The volume of litiga-
tion sometimes may account for a court’s lackadaisical
attitude toward the facts of a case. There are also in-
stances, however, in which there is little doubt that a
court has closely examined and understood the factual
record, and then produced a recitation and interpreta-
tion of the facts that not only is at variance with the
record, but appears to have been deliberately recon-
structed to achieve a particular result. 
One well-known instance is Harris v. New York,3 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that statements
elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona4 may be used
to impeach a defendant’s credibility. In deciding this
controversial question, the Court’s majority declared:
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“Petitioner makes no claim that the statements made to
the police were coerced or involuntary.”5 However, it is
absolutely clear that the record contains abundant evi-
dence that such a claim was made, and that the facts in
the case plausibly support such a claim.6
Another example of an arguably deliberate misrepre-
sentation of the factual record is provided by Professor
Anthony D’Amato, in describing the facts in a notorious
Chicago murder case. D’Amato, who participated in the
federal habeas corpus proceedings, convincingly argues
not only that the defendant was factually innocent, but
that the opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
seriously distorted the facts. The most telling misrepre-
sentation was the court’s treatment of the time line for
the murder to create a theory justifying the defendant’s
conviction. In doing so, the court had to discount the
prosecution’s own theory of the time line.
Critics have complained that courts frequently falsify
or misrepresent facts. Dean Monroe Freedman, in a
speech to the Federal Circuit Judicial Conference,
protested the practice whereby judicial opinions “falsify
the facts of the cases that have been argued,” make
“disingenuous use or omission of material authorities,”
or “cover up these things with no-publication or no-
citation rules.”7
Changing the Facts of an Already 
Published Opinion
The extent to which appellate courts change the sub-
stance of a previously published opinion is difficult to
ascertain. There often is no way to study the question un-
less one is able to compare the original opinion, either in
a slip sheet, advance sheet, or electronic format, with the
version as it finally appears in a hardbound volume.
There are occasions, of course, when a judicial opinion
notifies its audience of a substantive change, typically by
reciting that the original opinion has been amended.
However, sometimes opinions are changed without any
notice, so that it becomes very difficult for anyone other
than the attorneys to know of the alteration.
For example, in United States v. Valentine,8 the
Eleventh Circuit vacated a sentence because the district
judge committed plain error in failing to give the defen-
dant notice that it was considering increasing the sen-
tence from the sentencing range provided by the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines. However, in the original
opinion electronically reproduced on Westlaw,9 the
court included the following passages highly critical of
the prosecutor:
Responsibility for this error, we believe, lies equally
with the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”).
When prosecuting a criminal case, an AUSA is both a
representative of the United States and an officer of the
court; as such, he or she is charged with ensuring that
justice is done according to law.
In Valentine’s sentencing hearing, the district judge de-
parted upward sua sponte from the guideline offense
level, eventually arriving (through no guided means) at
a sentence approximately three times as severe as the
one mandated by the guidelines. The AUSA knew—or
should have known—not only that an unguided depar-
ture was of questionable legality, but also that the dis-
trict court, in imposing its sentence, had disregarded
Burns’ instructions. [Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129
(1991)]. The AUSA’s obligation at sentencing (as an of-
ficer of the court) was to inform the district court of
such error in the hope that the court would obviate the
need for this appeal by remedying the error. The re-
sources of this court, the district court (which now must
conduct a new sentencing hearing), and the office of the
United States Attorney (which has had to brief and
argue this appeal as well as participate in a new sen-
tencing hearing) are too limited to waste on unneces-
sary—and easily avoidable—litigation.
In the official version of the opinion formally pub-
lished in Volume 21 of the Federal Reporter 3d Series,
the above paragraphs were excised,10 leaving only the
isolated reference to the district court’s commission of
“plain error” in not affording the defendant notice of the
proposed sentence. Moreover, there is no indication in
the final published opinion why the original opinion
was changed, or why the court’s initial rebuke of the
prosecutor was removed.
Another instance of a court altering findings con-
tained in an originally published opinion is the opinion
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Reyes.11 In Reyes, the Second Circuit reversed a narcotics
conspiracy conviction because the prosecutor elicited
inadmissible hearsay testimony from a government
agent by contending that the testimony was merely
“background,” when in fact it was used to prove the
truth of the information and thereby seriously prejudice
the fair trial rights of the defendants. The following is a
portion of the prosecutor’s direct examination of the
agent:
Question: [By Prosecutor]: Now, did you have further
discussions with [Fernando and Francisco] [two other
co-conspirators] at some time after one o’clock on Sep-
tember 20 of 1990?
Answer: [By Customs Agent Caggiano]: Yes
Question: And did those further discussions with these
individuals cause you to believe that there were other
people involved with them in this particular criminal
activity?
Answer: Yes, I did.
Question: And who were those two individuals?
Answer: Would you repeat the question?
Question: Yes. As a result of your further conversations,
did you come to a conclusion that there were other in-
dividuals involved in this criminal enterprise?
Answer: Yes, I did.
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Question: And who were those other individuals?
Answer: Rafael Reyes and Jeffrey Stein.12
In its originally published version, in the form of a
slip opinion as well as in the electronic reproduction, the
Second Circuit found that the Assistant United States
Attorney who prosecuted the case had unfairly manip-
ulated the direct examination of the government agent
by pretending to offer the testimony for the non-hearsay
purpose of explaining the agent’s state of mind, when in
reality the prosecutor was using the testimony for the
forbidden purpose of insinuating that other co-conspir-
ators had acknowledged to the agent that co-defendants
Reyes and Stein had participated in the conspiracy. The
Second Circuit agreed that the trial prosecutor had used
this proof 
not for the limited non-hearsay purpose for which the
evidence was apparently offered, but for the truth of what
Fernando stated. In addition, the Assistant United States
Attorney [in his summation] seriously distorted and ex-
aggerated what Fernando was reported to have said.13
However, in its amended opinion, contained in the
official version published in Volume 18 of the Federal
Reporter 3d Series, the passage above has been elimi-
nated. In its place, the appellate panel wrote:
We are assured by the Government and are fully con-
vinced that the discrepancy between Caggiano’s testi-
mony and the summation was not intentional. Al-
though the mistake had innocent origins, our concern is
for its possible effect on the jury, especially in that it was
coupled with the other hearsay testimony that commu-
nicated Fernando’s implication of Stein.14
The court’s absolution of the prosecutor of any mis-
conduct in its revised opinion is curious. To an informed
observer familiar with the record, the prosecutor in
Reyes committed deliberate misconduct by questioning
the agent under the guise of “background” for the pur-
pose of introducing enormously damaging testimony
that one co-conspirator had identified two other co-de-
fendants as having participated in the conspiracy. Every
experienced prosecutor is aware of how this pernicious
tactic can subtly circumvent the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause.15 A court is fully justified, as was
the Second Circuit in its original opinion, in concluding
that the prosecutor intentionally planted in the jurors’
minds the unfair and highly damaging impression that
the one defendant had implicated other defendants.
Another egregious instance of a court cleansing the
record of references to prosecutorial misconduct is
United States v. Collicott.16 In Collicott, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a narcotics conviction be-
cause the trial judge erroneously admitted hearsay
statements expressly insinuating the defendant’s guilt
under the mistaken exceptions for prior consistent state-
ments and past recollection recorded. The trial error was
obvious, and the prejudice considerable, as the Ninth
Circuit concluded. However, in its original opinion,
published in the official soft-cover Federal Reporter
“advance sheets” as well as reproduced electronically,
the court appended a footnote that harshly rebuked the
trial prosecutor:
Though the trial court erred in admitting Zaidi’s prior
statements, it did so only upon invitation from the Gov-
ernment. We admonish the Assistant U.S. Attorney in
this case for engaging in prosecutorial overkill, a prac-
tice employed by a few overzealous prosecutors who
try to slip in damaging evidence through the back door,
without focus on the rules of evidence or the conse-
quences on appeal, hoping that this scattergun ap-
proach will hit some evidentiary target.
Regrettably, and incomprehensibly, the appellate
panel excised this footnote from its published opinion in
the hardbound Volume 92 of the Federal Reporter 3d Se-
ries. Thus, the original opinion, containing an important
judicial critique of a common, and flagrant, prosecutor-
ial tactic of introducing damaging hearsay through the
“back door,” has been erased.17
Finally, there are occasions when an appellate court
decides that it is appropriate to identify by name in a ju-
dicial opinion an attorney who has committed miscon-
duct or otherwise violated rules of trial practice. Indeed,
given the paucity of professional or other discipline of
errant lawyers, and particularly of prosecutors, courts
have suggested that such personal attribution might
serve as an effective deterrent to misconduct.18 So, in
United States v. Kojayan,19 the Ninth Circuit reversed a
narcotics conviction because the prosecutor committed
outrageous misconduct by lying to the jury and the trial
judge about whether a particular cooperating witness
was available to give testimony for the government.
After the defense attorney argued in summation that a
particular individual who was privy to the drug trans-
action could have been called as a government witness,
but was not, the prosecutor made the following state-
ment to the jury: 
The government can’t force someone to talk. He has the
right to remain silent. Don’t be misled that the govern-
ment could have called Nourian.
The prosecutor was lying, because as the opinion cor-
rectly notes, the witness had entered into a cooperation
agreement with the prosecutor and had promised to tes-
tify truthfully in any matters in which the government
might request his testimony. In reversing the conviction,
the Ninth Circuit, in a scathing opinion by Judge Alex
Kozinski, condemned the prosecutor for his deceit. In-
deed, the misconduct was so flagrant that the court
identified the prosecutor by name throughout the opin-
ion, which was originally published electronically and
in California’s Daily Appellate Report.20 However, in
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the published decision of Kojayan that appears in the
hardbound Volume 8 of the Federal Reporter 3d Series,
the places in the original opinion where the prosecutor’s
name appeared have been changed to “the Assistant
United States Attorney,” or the “AUSA.” Although the
court’s harsh rebuke remains, and the conviction va-
cated, the opinion now conceals the prosecutor’s iden-
tity, and the court gave no reason why it suppressed that
information.
Excising Published Opinions
Occasionally, courts issue opinions that are duly pub-
lished in the regional reporter’s “advance sheets” and
given an appropriate numerical citation, only to be
withdrawn when the opinion
is formally reproduced in the
hardbound volume of the re-
porter. When the reader goes
to the particular pages of the
bound volume, the reader en-
counters a series of blank
pages where the earlier pub-
lished opinion would have
been reproduced. Moreover,
there is no indication by the
court of the reason for the re-
moval of the opinion. Indeed, the deletion of some ar-
guably controversial opinions raises troubling questions
about the motivation for the deletion.
Two examples suffice. In United States v. Tarricone,
originally published in a soft-cover advance sheet,21 as
well as electronically,22 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing
to determine whether false testimony by the prosecu-
tion’s cooperating witness affected the jury’s verdict.
The panel’s opinion is emphatically clear that the fed-
eral prosecutors knew that their witness’s testimony
was false. The appellate panel wrote: “The govern-
ment’s action in deliberately soliciting testimony which
it had every reason to believe to be false, and which it
now concedes was false, is altogether unacceptable.”23
However, in Volume 11 of the Federal Reporter 3d Se-
ries, pages 24-26 are blank, and there is only an “Edi-
tor’s Note” that this opinion has been withdrawn at the
court’s request. There is no explanation for the with-
drawal.
Similarly, in United States v. Escamilla, published in
the soft-cover advance sheets,24 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed a narcotics conviction because the
trial prosecutor improperly introduced statements
made by the defendant during a plea agreement which
was later revoked. According to the court, the prosecu-
tor engaged in “fundamental unfairness” by using the
benefit of its plea bargain to convict the defendant, but
denying the defendant his benefit of the bargain.25 How-
ever, as in Tarricone, pages 465-469 of hardbound Vol-
ume 975 of the Federal Reporter 2d Series are blank,
since the opinion was ordered withdrawn by the court.
No explanation is given for the excision.
Unpublished Opinions
The opinion’s role is drastically reduced by practices
such as selective publication, summary disposition, and
vacatur upon settlement. Unpublished opinions are an
extremely common practice in the federal system. Fed-
eral courts of appeals, under a variety of differing and
inconsistent rules, issue well over 10,000 unpublished
opinions annually. There has been considerable acade-
mic and judicial commentary over the practice, much of
it critical. The Anastasoff case,
discussed above, is only the
latest manifestation of the
controversy. 
Summary disposition oc-
curs when a court announces
its judgment of affirmance or
reversal orally in open court
or with a very brief (usually
one sentence or one word)
order without any explana-
tion for the disposition.
There are nearly as many summary dispositions as there
are unpublished opinions. The precedential value of
summary dispositions is unclear and varies from circuit
to circuit.
Vacatur upon settlement is a practice whereby courts
excise decisions in accordance with settlement agree-
ments by the parties. Again, the use of this practice
varies among the circuits. The vacatur has the effect of
nullifying a court’s decision without any explanation of
the reasons. Thus, there may be confusion about the
state of the law following vacatur, because the vacated
judgment leaves a void regarding whether the vacated
judgment was correct.
The dominant rationale for non-publication has been
the explosion of the courts’ dockets and the costs associ-
ated with expanded publication of routine cases that ar-
guably do not establish new law. An efficiency rationale
for limiting publication is the extent to which it helps
alleviate the huge backlog of cases. If opinions are selec-
tively published, judges can spend less time writing
opinions and more time deciding a greater number of
cases. 
However, routinely suppressing decisions has sev-
eral costs. Unpublished opinions, as Judge Patricia Wald
wrote, “increase the risk of nonuniformity, allow diffi-
cult issues to be swept under the carpet, and result in a
body of ‘secret’ law practically inaccessible to many
lawyers.”26 This criticism has considerable merit. And
now that the explosion in electronic reporting has made
Federal courts of appeals, 
under a variety of differing 
and inconsistent rules, issue 
well over 10,000 unpublished
opinions annually.
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unpublished opinions more accessible, there may be less
need for such a rule. In any event, courts should permit
anyone, party or nonparty, to petition a court to publish
an unpublished opinion. Finally, the practice of vacatur
upon settlement should be abolished, and courts should
be prohibited from summarily disposing of a case with-
out clearly explaining the reasons for the decision.
Conclusion
As this discussion has demonstrated, much of the
law is hidden from the public’s view. Judges control
their cases, their dockets, and the manner and openness
of the decision-making process. Nobody would dis-
agree that the law needs to be visible to the public, and
judges need to be accountable to the public. A court’s
written opinion reveals to the public the court’s analy-
sis, reasoning, and grounds for decision. The opinion
provides a safeguard against judicial abuse of power or
dereliction of responsibilities. Hiding or altering opin-
ions without adequate explanation affects the legiti-
macy of the judicial process, and of the law.
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